Giorgallis’ paper is structured as follows.
Following this Introduction (Section 1), Section 2 examines a set of mainstream assumptions that collectively constitute the ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault Citation1977) underpinning heritage law, through which colonial logics continue to be reproduced.
Section 3 then delineates key contributions of decolonial theory that may enable a (re)reading of heritage law through a decolonial lens. Building on this analysis,
Section 4 advances the paper’s central argument by making the case for a structural renewal of heritage law, and consequently heritage studies, one that moves beyond piecemeal interventions to interrogate the architectures through which colonial epistemologies are embedded and sustained, while also identifying some of its possible defining features.
The concluding section emphasises that, despite important advances across disciplines and institutions, current debates remain marked by the absence of a coherent structural framework capable of situating these efforts (Section 5). It contends that decolonisation is frequently invoked to describe a range of practices without being reducible to any single one of them. Accordingly, the paper should be read not as a conclusion but as a point of departure: a call for a decolonial turn understood as a conceptual and structural beginning rather than a completed project.
